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Can Equity Be Separated
from Efficiency 
in School Finance Debates?
Eric A. Hanushek 
University of Rochester
School finance discussions have concentrated on equity and rest on 
a few elementary premises. Poor children, often residing in decaying 
cities, do worse in terms of achievement, jobs, and overall success than 
children from better environments. Schools are society's designated 
institution to remedy this situation—but schools serving the disadvan- 
taged are hampered in this task by a lack of sufficient resources. With 
more funding, these schools could put in place the successful programs 
that are available, and the cycle of poverty could be broken. It is only 
equitable then to support poor schools at the level at which schools for 
otherwise more advantaged students are financed. The more recent 
variant of the discussion, focusing on an adequacy version of equity, 
begins by noting the need for high quality education in order for an 
individual to compete successfully in the labor market, and then turns 
to a statement of how overall funding for schools must be increased to 
provide everybody with acceptable opportunities.
These common arguments are simple, straightforward, and compel 
ling. Unfortunately, they are also seriously flawed. The quest for equity 
has generally pointed to policies that neither promote greater equity 
nor help deal with the serious schooling problems facing the United 
States.
For over two decades, courts and legislatures have been embroiled 
in debate and controversy over the way in which local public schools 
are financed. Interestingly, this has been an area where the states have 
completely dominated policy deliberations, and the federal govern 
ment has never played an important role. Indeed, as a direct result of 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
*This is a revised and expanded version of Hanushek 1991.
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trict v. Rodriguez, the court discussion has been conducted exclusively 
at the state level. Each state has followed a different course based on 
the requirements of its state constitution, the preferences of its citizens 
and legislators, and the wisdom of its courts. Nevertheless, while 
sometimes obscured by the details of specific state actions, there are 
common elements to the school finance policy developments in the 
states.
One important lesson learned over time is that school finance court 
cases, legislative decisions, and school policies in general are more 
complicated than was previously thought. The framework for delibera 
tions on school finance reform was developed in the 1960s and given 
national attention through the landmark case in California, Serrano v. 
Priest. This case, which has been transported elsewhere, set out what is 
now the standard argument: 1 (1) Traditional funding of schools, which 
relies heavily on local funds raised substantially by property taxes, 
leads to large disparities in the education available to rich (suburban) 
students and to poor (urban and rural) students; and (2) The inequities 
in the quality of schooling resulting from the fiscal system must be cor 
rected, and the courts are an obvious route to forcing the legislature to 
provide the economically and educationally disadvantaged with better 
schools.
An updated version of these arguments is found in Kozol (1991), 
where the disparities in schools between some of the nation's best and 
worst schools are described in vivid detail. Armed with this descriptive 
information, Kozol proceeds directly to the policy conclusion that all 
schools should be moved to duplicate the very best, a conclusion that 
merges both the equity and the adequacy arguments.
We have now discovered that many of these simplistic views are 
misleading, if not just plain wrong. The required actions involve more 
fundamental adjustments than merely redirecting funds, and these fun 
damental changes are difficult to implement directly from the court or 
from the capitol. These complications are addressed in the subsequent 
discussion.
This paper considers the overarching public policy issues involved 
in searching for improved equity through altering school financing 
arrangements, concentrating on the central policy issues that transcend 
state boundaries. Moreover, it avoids all consideration of legal theories
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and interpretations that have surrounded the court cases except as they 
intersect with larger matters of broader educational policy.
Most school finance discussion, as opposed to school policy discus 
sion, has focused almost exclusively on variations in expenditure per 
student. A variety of reasons can be cited to explain this emphasis. 
First, expenditure levels are easily measured and easily modified by the 
court or legislature. Second, it seems reasonable to presume that what a 
school can offer in terms of quality or breadth is directly correlated 
with the resources devoted to the task. Finally, even if there is some 
doubt about how well money is currently being spent, money well 
spent would surely make a difference. Each of these premises is rea 
sonable if schools are operating efficiently. 2 Given efficient school 
operation, expenditure is a good index of performance. On the other 
hand, if schools are not operating efficiently, the interpretation of 
expenditure differences becomes totally ambiguous, because expendi 
ture variations need no longer be directly correlated with variations in 
school quality. Moreover, added funding of schools may lead to no 
gains in student performance.
One fundamental observation underlies the discussion in this paper: 
There is no systematic relationship between school expenditure and 
student performance. This observation implies a significant level of 
inefficiency in schools. Given that, legal arguments and policy deci 
sions based on expenditure variations are simply suspect, at least from 
an educational perspective. Indeed, many popular changes, both pro 
posed and adopted, no longer look like "reform" but instead tend to 
move us away from good policy.
School finance discussions have not totally ignored the potential pit 
falls of concentrating on expenditure alone. After passing references to 
issues of efficiency along with assertions that the research is ambigu 
ous,3 pragmatism is frequently claimed as the underlying justification: 
expenditure differences appear to be such a reasonable measure of dif 
ferences in schools, and they are measurable.4 1 argue later that this 
logic is likely to cause serious distortion in policies.
The plan of this paper is straightforward. It begins with a discussion 
of the evidence about expenditure and school performance. It then con 
siders how this evidence relates to court cases and overall judgments 
about a state's schools. It concludes with an examination of how court
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cases, and the related legislative actions, relate to effective policies 
toward schools.
What We Know About School Expenditure
Because the interpretation of expenditure differences is so central to 
all discussions of school finance, this section provides evidence con 
cerning the relationship between expenditure and student perfor 
mance.5 It is simply not possible to ignore these data in setting school 
policy when the objective is either to improve overall student perfor 
mance or advance the cause of true educational equity.
Aggregate Data
Much of the current concern about the performance of our schools is 
motivated by the fact that student performance has remained constant 
or actually fallen during a period in which school spending has contin 
ually increased. Figure 1 illustrates this by superimposing the trend in 
student performance on the trend in educational expenditure. Real 
expenditure per pupil has risen steadily and dramatically over the past 
two decades. Specifically, after allowing for inflation, expenditure per 
pupil more than doubled between 1967 and 1991; this corresponds to 
about a 3.5 percent compound annual growth rate. 6 At the same time, 
performance as measured by Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores fell 
to a level significantly below those attained during the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, while there was some recovery from the 1979-80 trough, 
the improvements of the early 1980s have now ceased.
There are reasons for quibbling about these specific statistics for 
both achievement and spending. The measurement of performance by 
SAT scores has been questioned because the test does not rely on a rep 
resentative sample, because the test-taking population has changed 
over time, and because the content of the test itself may have changed. 
Analysis of these objections, however, indicates clearly that the 
observed achievement decline is not simply an artifact of that specific 
test. Further, declines have been registered on a variety of other tests 
given over the same time (see Congressional Budget Office 1986,
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1987). Continued international evidence also places U.S. students 
behind a surprisingly wide range of foreign students on math and sci 
ence performance. For example, in tests of advanced algebra for 
twelfth graders in 1982, U.S. students trail students from Hong Kong 
to Hungary, bettering only the students from Thailand in fifteen coun 
tries sampled (McKnight et al. 1987).7 Thus, there is no doubt that stu 
dents are performing worse now than they did in the past, when 
spending on schools was noticeably less.
Figure 1
Real School Expenditure and Achievement 
1967-1991
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*/Current expenditure in 1992 dollars per student in average daily attendance (ADA).
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Similarly, some have argued that the tasks facing schools have 
changed over time so that the comparisons of expenditures are not 
strictly appropriate. For example, increased expenditure may partly
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reflect attempts to educate more expensive students—handicapped stu 
dents, immigrants, and other educationally disadvantaged. Again, how 
ever, while these changes in student populations undoubtedly have 
some influence on costs, they are insufficient to explain the substantial 
aggregate increases that have transpired.
Moreover, it is important to note that the expenditure patterns reflect 
a number of underlying adjustments, which mirror common policy rec 
ommendations. Pupil-teacher ratios have fallen steadily for the past 
three decades. While there were twenty-five students per teacher in 
public elementary and secondary schools in 1965, there were fewer 
than eighteen in 1985. 8 Over the same period, the proportion of teach 
ers holding a master's degree or above went from under a quarter to 
over half. Median teacher experience also almost doubled, going from 
eight years in 1966 to fifteen in 1986. 9 The only aggregate input not to 
follow this steady pattern is teacher salaries. Real teacher salaries, as 
best we can tell, have cycled: average salaries rose through the 1960s, 
fell back in the mid to late 1970s, and rose again during the 1980s. 10
The aggregate picture is clear. School spending has increased dra 
matically since the mid-1960s, largely through the instituting of poli 
cies that educational decision makers have proposed as a way of 
improving student performance—reducing class sizes and upgrading 
the education and experience of the teaching force. Yet student perfor 
mance has actually fallen over the same period.
Individual- and School-Level Analyses
Although research into the determinants of students' achievement 
takes various approaches, one of the most appealing and useful is what 
economists call the production function approach, or in other disci 
plines the input-output or cost-quality approach. In this approach, 
attention is focused primarily on the relationship between school out 
comes and measurable inputs into the educational process.
The origin of estimating input-output relations in schools is usually 
traced to the monumental U.S. study, Equality of Educational Oppor 
tunity, or what is more commonly known as the Coleman Report. 
Explicitly designed to study equity, this report was the U.S. Office of 
Education's response to a requirement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
to investigate the extent of inequality (by race, religion, or national ori-
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gin) in the nation's schools. The study's fundamental contribution was 
to direct attention to the distribution of student performance—the out 
puts with which I am concerned here. Instead of addressing questions 
of inequality simply by producing an inventory of differences among 
schools and teachers according to race and region of the country, the 
Coleman Report sought to provide an understanding of which, if any, 
of the observed differences in school resources were important for stu 
dent learning. This very different perspective—the right one when stu 
dent educational performance is the concern—set a standard in the 
school policy debate. Unfortunately, in the subsequent financial equity 
debate, this important innovation has been largely ignored.
The Coleman Report was widely interpreted as finding that schools 
are not very important in determining student achievement. Families 
and, to a lesser extent, peers were seen to be the primary determinants 
of variations in performance. The findings were clearly controversial 
and immediately led to a substantial research effort to compile addi 
tional evidence about the relationship between school resources and 
school performance.' }
The underlying model guiding the Coleman Report and most subse 
quent studies is very straightforward. It postulates that the output of the 
educational process—that is, the achievement of students—is related 
directly to a series of inputs. Policy makers directly control some of 
these inputs—for instance, the characteristics of schools, teachers, and 
curricula. Other factors, such as families and friends plus the innate 
endowments or learning capacities of the students, generally cannot be 
affected by public policy. Further, although achievement is usually 
measured at discrete points in time, the educational process is cumula 
tive; past inputs affect students' current levels of achievement.
Based upon this model, statistical techniques, typically some form 
of regression analysis, are employed to identify the specific determi 
nants of achievement and to make inferences about the relative impor 
tance of the various inputs into student performance. This summary 
highlights the overall findings from the research.
These studies of educational production relationships measure out 
put not only by student scores on standardized achievement tests but 
also by other quantitative measures, such as student attitudes, school 
attendance rates, and college continuation or dropout rates. The gen 
eral interpretation is that they are all plausible indicators of future sue-
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cess in the labor market. This interpretation has been confirmed by 
other research into labor market outcomes (see review in Hanushek, 
Rivkin, and Jamison 1992).
Empirical specifications of production function models have varied 
widely in details, but they have also had much in common. Family 
inputs tend to be measured by sociodemographic characteristics of the 
families, such as parental education, income, and family size. Peer 
inputs, when included, are typically aggregate summaries of the socio 
demographic characteristics of other students in the school. School 
inputs include measures of the teachers' characteristics (education 
level, experience, sex, race, and so forth), of the school's organization 
(class sizes, facilities, administrative expenditure, and so forth), and of 
district or community factors (for example, average expenditure lev 
els). Except for the original Coleman Report, most empirical work has 
relied on data, such as the normal administrative records of schools, 
that were constructed for other purposes.
Empirical Results for Expenditure Effects
The production function approach has been broadly employed to 
investigate the impact on school performance of the core factors deter 
mining expenditure on education. Instructional expenditure makes up 
about two-thirds of total school expenditures. Instructional expenditure 
is in turn determined mostly by teacher salaries and class sizes. Finally, 
in most U.S. school districts, teacher salaries are directly related to the 
years of teaching experience and educational level of the teacher. Thus, 
the basic determinants of instructional expenditure in a district are 
teacher experience, teacher education, and class size. Most studies, 
regardless of what other school characteristics might be included, ana 
lyze the effect of these factors on outcomes. (These are also the factors 
most likely to be found in any given data set, especially if the data 
come from standard administrative records.)
Because the analyses have such common specifications, the effects 
of the expenditure parameters can easily be tabulated. Here I present 
data from a reasonably exhaustive search that uncovered 187 separate 
"qualified studies" found in thirty-eight separate articles or books 
through the middle of 1988. 12 These studies, while restricted to public 
schools, cover all regions of the United States, different grade levels,
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different measures of performance, and different analytical and statisti 
cal approaches. About one-third draw their data from a single school 
district, while the remaining two-thirds compare school performance 
across multiple districts. A majority of the studies (104) use individual 
students as the unit of analysis, whereas the remainder rely upon 
aggregate school-, district-, or state-level data. The studies are split 
about evenly between primary schooling (grades one through six) and 
secondary schooling (grades seven through twelve). Over 70 percent of 
the studies measure school performance by some kind of standardized 
test. However, those using nontest measures (such as dropout rates, 
college continuation, attitudes, or performance after school) are for 
obvious reasons concentrated in studies of secondary schooling. There 
is no indication that differences in sample and study design lead to dif 
ferences in conclusions. 13
According both to conventional wisdom and to generally observed 
school policies, each factor should have a positive effect on student 
achievement. More education and more experience on the part of the 
teacher cost more and are presumed to improve individual student 
learning; smaller classes (more teachers per student) are also expected 
to be beneficial. 14 More spending in general, higher teacher salaries, 
better facilities, and better administration should also lead to better stu 
dent performance. The quantitative magnitudes of estimated relation 
ships are ignored at this point, and attention is focused on the direction 
of any estimated effect.
The data in table 1 provide a picture of how well conventional wis 
dom and common school policies hold up to analysis. The columns in 
the table divide the available estimates by direction of effect and statis 
tical significance. Since not all studies contain estimates of each expen 
diture component, the first column simply indicates the total number of 
estimates available. Thus, for example, 152 of the 187 studies include 
an estimate of the effect of teacher-pupil ratios, or class sizes. Of the 
152 estimates of the effects of class size, only 27 are statistically sig 
nificant. Of these, only 14 show a statistically significant positive rela 
tionship, whereas 13 display a negative relationship. 15 An additional 
125 estimates show that class size is not significant at the 5 percent 
level. 16 Nor does ignoring statistical significance help to confirm the 
benefits of small classes, since the insignificant coefficients have the 
"wrong" sign by a 46 to 34 margin. 17
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The entries for teacher education tell a similar story. The statistically 
significant results are split between positive and negative relationships, 
and in a vast majority of cases (100 out of 113) the estimated coeffi 
cients are statistically insignificant. Forgetting about statistical signifi 
cance and looking just at estimated signs again does not make a case 
for the importance of added schooling for teachers. 18
Table 1. Summary of the Estimated Relationship Between Student











































































Teacher experience is slightly different. A clear majority of esti 
mated coefficients point in the expected direction, and about 29 percent 
of the estimated coefficients are both statistically significant and of the 
conventionally expected sign. But these results only appear strong rela 
tive to the other school inputs; they are hardly overwhelming in an 
absolute sense. Moreover, they are subject to interpretive questions. 
Specifically, these positive correlations may result from senior teachers 
having the ability to locate themselves in schools and classrooms with 
good students. In other words, causation may run from achievement to 
experience and not the other way around.
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Overall, the results are startlingly consistent. No compelling evi 
dence emerges that teacher-pupil ratios, teacher education, or teacher 
experience have the expected positive effects on student achievement. 
There is no reason for confidence that hiring teachers with more educa 
tion or having smaller classes will improve student performance. Evi 
dence of the effect of teacher experience appears marginally more 
convincing, at least when no consideration is given to the magnitude of 
any relationship.
The remaining rows of table 1, summarizing information on other 
expenditure components, including administration, facilities, teacher 
salaries, and total expenditure per student, 19 provide poorer evidence 
on the relationship of resources and performance, but what evidence 
does exist is consistent with the previous results. The quality of admin 
istration is measured in a wide variety of ways, ranging from character 
istics of the principal to noninstructional expenditure per pupil. 
Similarly, the quality of facilities is identified through spending and 
many specific physical characteristics. If only because of the prepon 
derance of positive signs among the significant coefficients, adminis 
tration appears marginally stronger in its relationship to student 
achievement than facilities. Nevertheless, the available evidence on 
both again fails to support convincingly the conventional wisdom.
Finally, and not surprisingly, explicit measures of teacher salaries 
and expenditure per student do not indicate that they play an important 
role in determining achievement. 20 After all, the underlying compo 
nents of these expenditures were themselves unrelated to achievement. 
While negative expenditure effects—in which funds are not only 
unproductive but also harmful—are difficult to interpret, it is much 
easier to believe that differences in spending have little or no impact on 
student performance.
Without systematic tabulation of the results of the various studies, it 
would be easy to conclude that the findings are inconsistent. But there 
is a consistency, though it does not match the conventional wisdom. 
The research reveals no strong or systematic relationship between 
school expenditure and student performance. This is the case both 
when expenditures are decomposed into their underlying determinants 
and when they are considered in the aggregate. 21
Given the general biases toward the publication of statistically sig 
nificant estimates, the paucity of results confirming the conventional
46 Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance Debates?
wisdom is notable. The common calculation of statistical significance 
is inappropriate when a series of sequential tests of alternative formu 
lations of the achievement relationship is conducted. A sequential 
approach built on the calculated statistical tests will yield biased esti 
mates of significance. In reality, too many estimated parameters will be 
judged to be significant. 22
These results reflect the structure and operating procedures of 
schools observed in existing settings. A different organizational struc 
ture with different incentives could produce very different results. For 
example, almost every economist would support the position that 
increasing teacher salaries would expand and improve the pool of 
potential teachers. However, whether this improves the quality of 
teaching depends on whether or not schools can systematically choose 
and retain the best teachers from the pool. The results on salary differ 
entials presented previously might be very different if schools faced a 
greater incentive to produce student achievement and if mechanisms 
for teacher selection were altered. In other words, there seems little 
question that money could count. It just does not systematically do so 
with the current organization of schools.
Moreover, the consistency criterion used to judge the results and the 
potential for policy improvements does not suggest that money never 
counts. The results are entirely compatible with the notion that some 
schools use funds effectively and others do not. But unless some way is 
found to change the districts that would squander additional funds into 
districts that would use them effectively, added resources are not likely 
to lead to any improvement in average performance. Good uses of 
funds are balanced by bad uses within the current structure.
Other Inputs into Education
Since the publication of the Coleman Report, intense debate has sur 
rounded the fundamental question of whether schools and teachers are 
at all important to the educational performance of students. The Cole 
man Report has been commonly interpreted as finding that variations 
in school resources explain only a negligible portion of the variation in 
student achievement. If this were true, it would not matter which par 
ticular teacher a student had or which school a student attended—a 
conclusion that most people would have difficulty accepting.
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The findings of direct analyses of differences among teachers are 
unequivocal and indicate a very different conclusion: teachers and 
schools differ dramatically in their effectiveness. A number of studies 
provide analyses of the differential effectiveness of teachers and 
schools based on estimation of the average gain in performance of each 
teacher's (or school's) students. 23 These studies confirm that there are 
striking differences in teacher performance as measured by average 
gain in student achievement.
The faulty impressions about the nonimportance of teachers and 
schools left by the Coleman Report and a number of subsequent stud 
ies are the result of a confusion between measures of effectiveness and 
true effectiveness itself. In other words, existing measures of the char 
acteristics of teachers and schools are seriously flawed and thus are 
poor indicators of true effectiveness; when these measurement errors 
are avoided, schools are seen to have important effects on student per 
formance.
These input-output analyses have also investigated a wide variety of 
other school and nonschool factors. Although it is difficult to be spe 
cific in any summary of other factors because the specifications of the 
various inputs employed in the statistical analyses vary widely, three 
generalizations are possible. First, family background is clearly very 
important in explaining differences in achievement. Second, while 
considerable attention has been given to the characteristics of peers or 
other students within schools, the findings about their effects are 
ambiguous. Finally, studies have examined many additional measures 
of the effects of schools, teachers, curricula, and especially instruc 
tional methods on achievement, but no simple characterization of good 
teachers emerges.24
While not systematically addressed by existing research, one plausi 
ble interpretation of the combined results of these studies is that an 
important element of "skill" is involved in being a successful teacher. 25 
Skill refers simply to the ability of some teachers to promote higher 
achievement among their students. The evidence previously presented 
then indicates that it is currently impossible to identify, much less to 
measure, components or elements of this skill with any precision. 
Moreover, the direct evidence casts doubt on whether any form of 
teacher training course could be organized to foster high skill levels in
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teachers. In simplest terms, if we cannot define or measure it, how can 
we teach it?
Implications for Equity and School Finance Reform
I now turn to the application of this evidence to consideration of 
school finance reform. Here I sketch some obvious and some less obvi 
ous implications of the preceding findings. Again, while school finance 
policy frequently contains many state-specific nuances, this discussion 
concentrates on two common elements of "reform." Most school 
finance reform programs, based on simplistic equity notions, assume 
that a basic objective is to limit local variations in school expenditure 
or, if variations are to exist, to insure that such variations are not 
related to the property wealth of the district.
The Central Implication
The evidence on school performance indicates that variations in 
school expenditure are exceedingly poor measures of the variations in 
education provided to students. Most directly, when students' learning 
is the concern, the conventional evidence about inter-district disparities 
in spending does not identify where educational deficiencies are to be 
found, and such evidence is generally irrelevant for either an equal pro 
tection or an educational disparity court case. 26 Such evidence about 
expenditure simply does not indicate differential provision of educa 
tion. Therefore, showing how expenditures vary, either absolutely or in 
accordance with characteristics of districts and students, does not have 
much use.
We must be quite precise about the interpretation of expenditure. As 
previously noted, most economists, including myself, would readily 
accept that differences in spending would be directly related to the 
education provided if schools were operating efficiently. The previ 
ously presented evidence indicates clearly, however, that assuming 
efficiency in spending is entirely inappropriate.
While there are many alternative ways to define and measure educa 
tional equity, only the most narrow of these would call for paying
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attention to expenditure variations in the face of the evidence that such 
expenditure variations are unrelated to the education provided. The 
standard employed would have to be a rigid one linked to dollars, with 
total disregard for the quality of schooling received by students.
In other words, equity and efficiency are inextricably linked. It is not 
possible to ignore efficiency issues under the guise of being concerned 
solely with equity.
Other Implications
There is another side to this discussion: What is likely to happen if 
we disregard the evidence on the interpretation of expenditure differ 
ences and simply make policy on the basis of expenditure differences? 
This consideration is prompted by a few arguments that are sometimes 
heard, such as: "The educational problem of the poor is serious, and 
equalizing expenditure cannot hurt;" or "We should at least give every 
one the same chance to make mistakes." The policies flowing from 
such notions do, unfortunately, have a down side to them.
First, a likely reaction to any move to lessen variation in expenditure 
is to increase the total level of expenditure on schools. The reason is 
simple: a state legislature, faced with a need to alter expenditure pat 
terns, finds it much easier to redistribute a larger pie than a fixed pie. In 
the school finance debate, this is frequently referred to as "leveling 
up," or bringing the low-spending districts up to the spending levels of 
the top districts. The arguments behind the policy are generally based 
either on the need to do better or on pure political necessity. On the 
other hand, because of the potential for disruption and the obvious 
divisiveness of "leveling down," there is seldom much interest in this 
idea. The previous evidence indicates, however, that added funds will 
on average be dissipated on things that do not improve student 
achievement (at least unless other, larger changes are also made). 
Teachers, administrators, and perhaps taxpayers in some districts gain 
ing funds will probably be happier, but the average state taxpayer and 
parent will not find that the resulting changes do much more than 
increase tax bills.
Second, there is no assurance that the new funds will go to the 
schools of poor children. As indicated previously, one of the pervasive 
views of finance "reform" is that poor children will be helped (or at
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least will have a better chance by virtue of greater funding). However, 
reform schemes designed to follow district wealth patterns can lead to 
unexpected outcomes because frequently there is not a strong relation 
ship between district wealth and the concentration of student poverty. 
Some states find that wealthier districts in terms of property wealth per 
student also have concentrations of poorer families and children. New 
York State provides a good illustration. Consider the six largest cities 
in New York State: New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Yonkers, Syra 
cuse, and Albany. Albany and Yonkers have tax bases in which real 
property per student is greater than the state average; New York City, 
Rochester, and Syracuse have tax bases per student only slightly below 
the state average; and Buffalo is left with a tax base 30 percent below 
the state average. Yet all of these districts except Yonkers have poverty 
rates for children above the state average. For example, while the aver 
age poverty rate in New York State for children 18 or younger in 1980 
was 19 percent, it was over 36 percent in New York City and over 30 
percent in Buffalo.27 The largest districts in the state intervened (unsuc 
cessfully) on the side of the plaintiffs in the Levittown case and intro 
duced a new argument, municipal overburden,28 in order to protect 
their funding. In other states, property wealth and poverty may be neg 
atively correlated—that is, high property wealth tends to be found in 
districts with a small poverty population, but even in these states the 
overall pattern clearly does not hold jurisdiction by jurisdiction. 29 
Therefore, while not inevitable, it is likely that many districts serving 
poor children are hurt in spending terms by plans to neutralize expen 
diture on the basis of district wealth. Moreover, because of a combina 
tion of federal and state grants, districts with concentrations of poor 
students frequently have above average spending, regardless of their, 
property wealth or overall economic health. 30 Programs to limit varia 
tions in expenditure could operate to cut back existing compensatory 
spending for disadvantaged students.
Third, spending differences may not even accurately reflect the real 
resources each district is able to deliver (i.e., the actual educational 
inputs). This is the simple result of possible cost differentials facing 
individual districts. That is, if districts face different prices for things 
they might buy, from teachers to buildings and equipment, dollar varia 
tions themselves do not indicate variations in available real resources. 
As a simple example, if the schools in one city were less pleasant and
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desirable than those in other cities, it would be necessary to pay a 
higher salary to hire a teacher of equal quality. 31 An extension of this 
notion involves districts faced with concentrations of students who are 
more difficult to educate because of a variety of pre-existing educa 
tional deficiencies. These, like cost differences for inputs, lead to 
expenditure variations in districts behaving in an otherwise identical 
manner. (Indeed, many state funding formulae recognize such issues 
and attempt to adjust for input cost differences or for differences in stu 
dent preparation, handicap status, and the like, even though the magni 
tude of any real cost differences is poorly understood).
Fourth, districts themselves are not entities to which educational 
policies should be geared. Individuals choose among districts when 
they enter an area and move among districts after they live in an area. 
In fact, there is extensive evidence that individuals make choices 
among districts in part to satisfy their demands for various public ser 
vices. Some people who place considerable weight on schooling search 
for districts that seem to emphasize quality schooling. Others who 
emphasize other goods or even low public expenditure seek districts 
that provide an agreeable level and pattern of the services they are 
looking for. Certainly this system has some drawbacks. Moving can be 
expensive, and some might find it difficult to move to the districts they 
would like, for example, because of housing prices, commuting costs, 
or discrimination. Nevertheless, the fundamental fact for this discus 
sion is that individuals generally have considerable latitude in choos 
ing schools. They are not inextricably tied to a particular district and 
are not doomed to whatever expenditure levels currently exist in a spe 
cific district. Finally, individual districts change their expenditure in 
line with the desires of the population and with population shifts, so 
that districts may increase or decrease their expenditure over time. For 
example, it is possible to trace the movement of district expenditure in 
the State of Indiana between 1977 and 1987. Only forty-three of the 
seventy-six top spending districts in 1977 remained in the top quartile 
in 1987; only forty-two of the seventy-six bottom quartile districts 
remained there from 1977 through 1987. Thus, policy discussions that 
speak generally of the population as captives of districts with undesir 
able spending patterns tend to miss an extremely important feature of 
the political economy of local jurisdictions. (The special problems of 
"mobility-constrained" groups, such as the poor, are discussed below).
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Fifth, the preferences and movements of citizens across district 
boundaries have direct ramifications for the observed distribution of 
property wealth. Specifically, districts that appear to offer a particularly 
favorable tax and school quality package will appear relatively attrac 
tive to many people. This will lead to a bidding up of housing prices in 
such desirable jurisdictions, because they are in demand, other things 
being equal. In fact, it is well documented that "otherwise identical" 
houses will sell for different amounts because of citizens' evaluations 
of the taxes and the schooling being offered. (See Tiebout 1956, Gates 
1969, Rosen and Fullerton 1977, and Wendling 1981). Another way of 
saying this is that some people pay for their schooling up front through 
the capitalization of school advantages into the price of homes. Some 
places that initially look attractive from the vantage point of the tax 
rate alone are really less attractive because the low rate is multiplied 
times a high valuation (relative to the other attributes of the home). 
This has, among other things, a direct effect on the property tax base of 
the community—something that is often entered into the discussion of 
the "inequities" of the school finance system. Moreover, reform 
changes in the funding formula of the state imply distributing some 
what arbitrary capital gains and losses across the jurisdictions in the 
state. Some places will be made more fiscally attractive and some less 
by major changes in the financing laws, leading to changes in the capi 
talization of fiscal differences.
Sixth, in most states spending levels reflect a wide variety of things, 
including the preferences of the citizens. While it is common to argue 
that local property wealth is the primary determinant of expenditure 
differences, that simply is not the case. For example, even though New 
Jersey and Indiana have relied on local property taxes to fund schools, 
rough estimates indicate that less than a fifth of the variation in expen 
diture would be eliminated by totally equating local property wealth 
per student. 32 A combination of local preferences, differences in stu 
dent needs, curricular choices, cost differentials, and a variety of other 
factors completely dominate property wealth in the determination of 
the pattern of expenditure.
Seventh, differences in tax rates across communities bear no direct 
relationship to the degree of educational equity. Most importantly, 
school finance reform has been based on perceived differences in the 
quality of education available, and the quality of education is not
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related in any simple way to tax rates. The tax rate provides an indica 
tion of the price that residents face to raise funds for schools, and high 
tax rates might indicate that some districts find it more difficult than 
others to raise funds through the property tax. But tax rates differ 
according to a variety of factors, including community preferences, 
community income and wealth, the amount of nonresidential wealth in 
the tax base, and so forth. The pattern of tax rates may be an issue from 
the standpoint of various notions of "taxpayer equity," but tax rates sel 
dom have much to do with considerations of equity in education. Fur 
ther, while the education clauses of state constitutions may require 
states to provide certain levels of education, they never indicate that 
school tax rates must be equalized across a state.
This list of likely ramifications underscores the point that simple 
alterations in expenditure patterns can have consequential and undesir 
able effects. What is already known about the educational process and 
about behavior of local jurisdictions leads to the inescapable conclu 
sion suggested in my introduction: the general assumptions behind 
early school finance reform are misleading at best.
Magnitude of Expenditure Effects
The evidence presented in Table 1 did indicate that a majority of 
studies found a positive relationship between aggregate expenditure 
and student performance, albeit few statistically significant relation 
ships. While this finding might suggest a potential for equity improve 
ment by means of adding resources to low-spending districts, moving 
to such policy deliberations requires consideration of the magnitude of 
any expenditure effects. Specifically, how much could achievement in 
low-spending districts be altered by an infusion of new resources?
Two alternative estimates, representing very different circum 
stances, illustrate why the magnitude of performance change associ 
ated with expenditure increases must enter into policy considerations. 
First, Wendling and Cohen (1981) conducted a study of expenditure 
effects in 1977-78 in New York State, the state with the second highest 
rate of spending (behind Alaska) during that year.33 Second, new evi 
dence for 1991 from the State of Alabama, with the 46th highest 
spending rate in 1990, provides information about expenditure rela 
tionships at low levels of expenditure.
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New York has consistently been at or near the top of spending on 
schools across all states. Its average expenditure in 1978 was 45 per 
cent above the average for the country. Wendling and Cohen (1981) 
examine whether or not expenditure differences among districts in 
New York matter for student achievement, and they conclude that 
indeed expenditure is important. They analyze average third-grade 
reading and mathematics achievement for 1,021 districts. While they 
examine various model formulations and different groupings of dis 
tricts,34 the results for the entire state are representative and provide a 
clear indication of how expenditure relates to student performance.
The estimated effect of approved operating expenditure35 on student 
performance is uniformly statistically significant, but the magnitude of 
the estimates shows the difference between statistical significance and 
policy significance. The estimated expenditure parameters are .001 and 
.002 for third-grade reading and mathematics performance, respec 
tively. This implies that a $1,000 increase in expenditure per student 
yields an additional point on the reading test and an additional two 
points on the mathematics test. While absolute scores are difficult to 
interpret, some idea of magnitude can be gained by looking at move 
ment in the distribution of spending and performance. An increase of 
$1,000 is a 50 percent increase in state school spending and is 2.2 stan 
dard deviations in expenditure within the sample of schools, but it 
yields an increase in performance of only .2 to .3 standard deviations. 
This is equivalent to moving the average student up to around the sixti 
eth percentile or to moving a student starting at the 10th percentile to 
the 15th percentile. In simple terms, attempting to increase perfor 
mance through simple increases in expenditure is very expensive.
Alabama is a relatively low-spending state, falling at the other end 
of the distribution from New York State. The state's highest-spending 
district in 1991 (Mountain Brook) had total current expenditure per 
student of $5,113. This is slightly below the mean level for the entire 
nation in 1991, for which the preliminary estimates are $5,237. The 
minimum spending in Alabama was about $2,900 per student. Thus, 
variations in spending in Alabama should provide some insight into 
whether or not there exists some threshold expenditure below which 
changes in spending have strong and noticeable effects on achieve 
ment—the issue that comes up in discussions of "adequacy" (Celis 
1992).
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The statistical analysis attempts to explain variations across districts 
in Alabama's Basic Competency Tests (BCTs). These are criterion-ref 
erenced tests adopted by the state board of education to measure 
whether or not students are accomplishing what was expected of them 
according to the curriculum for different grade and subject areas (read 
ing, mathematics, and language arts). The performance measure is the 
percentage of a district's students meeting the minimum standards for 
the specific tests ("passing"). 36 Weighted least squares regression anal 
ysis is employed to estimate the effect of current expenditure per stu 
dent in average daily attendance (ADA) on performance, while holding 
constant the influence of family background and school district type 
(i.e., city or county district). 37
The results of estimates for the State of Alabama can be easily sum 
marized. Table 2 presents the estimated expenditure effects. None of 
the nine estimated relationships is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level, and one is even negative. 38
Table 2. Estimated Change in BCT Pass Rate for Expenditure Increase
of $1,000 per Student in Average Daily Attendance (ADA): 
______Alabama, 1990-91___________________________
Test and Grade
Read Read Read Math Math Math Lang Lang Lang 























NOTE: Estimates are the weighted least squares regression estimates of the determinants of per 
cent passing the Alabama Basic Competency Test (BCT) for different subject areas and grades 
for 127 school districts in 1990-91 (Hoover and Mt. Brook excluded). Estimates equations 
include percent of students receiving free or reduced lunch; percent nonwhite; city school dis 
trict indicator; and current expenditure per ADA. Weights are the number of students in average 
daily attendance. 
Abbreviations:
ADA: per student in Average Daily Attendance 
BCT: Basic Competency Test
Table 3 presents the results of two alternative policy scenarios. The 
first brings all of the spending of districts below the median in the state 
up to the median. The second,, which is sometimes called "full leveling
Table 3. Predicted Change in State Pass Rates from Increased Spending: Alabama Districts, 1990-91
A. Partial leveling-up by bringing all low-spending districts to median (cost=$74
Reading Mathematics
grade 3 grade 6 grade 9 grade 3 grade 6 grade 9 grade 3
1990-91 pass 
rate 81.3 64.3 73.1 78.8 59.4 43.8 73.2 
Change in pass 
rate 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Projected pass 
rate 81.4 64.3 73.4 79.1 59.4 44.0 73.4
million)
Language




B. Full leveling-up by bringing all districts to top (cost=$1.05 billion)
1990-91 pass 
rate 81.3 64.3 73.1 78.8 59.4 43.8 73.2 
Change in pass 
rate 0.9 0.2 4.2 4.0 0.7 2.4 2.6 
Projected pass 
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up," brings all districts up to the level of the highest spending district 
in the state. Bringing all states to the median expenditure level would 
cost an additional $74 million (compared to total spending of $2.4 bil 
lion). While this increase of 3 percent is not a large relative change in 
expenditure, the top panel of table 3 indicates that it would yield 
imperceptible changes in performance on most of the tests. The bottom 
panel provides estimates of the achievement effects of full leveling 
up—i.e., bringing all district spending up to that of Mountain Brook. 
Such a policy would cost $1.05 billion and would yield at most a 4 per 
centage point increase in students passing the BCT in the state. The net 
impact of leveling up is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2 
Alabama Performance with Leveling-Up
r»ad-3 read-6 read-9 math-3 math-6 math-9 lang-3 lang-6 lang-9
Test and Grade
Actual 1990-91 Added Achievement
The importance of these results is clear. A policy of bringing all dis 
tricts to the top in spending would place Alabama schools at approxi 
mately the mean for the nation, up dramatically from its current
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position in the national distribution of spending. But this increase of 
the state's school spending by over one-third would have very small 
effects on aggregate school performance, at least if the schools behave 
in a way consistent with current practice. The resulting performance 
would remain very far below the state's goals of a 95 percent passing 
rate on the separate BCT tests.
There is also no evidence from analyzing the schools of Alabama 
that there exists a minimum threshold for school spending. There is no 
apparent range of stronger influence of spending on achievement than 
is found for the entire set of schools.
Policy Alternatives
Concerns about the implications of school finance reform do not, of 
course, vitiate the undeniable need to improve our public schools. The 
deplorable conditions described in Kozol (1991) require addressing. 
The intentions of finance reformers have been, in my opinion, good. 
Only their approach is questionable. Three general factors lead to the 
judgment that structural change is essential. First, in absolute terms 
students are not performing up to expectations. Performance, as mea 
sured by standardized tests over time, international comparisons of 
tests, various measures of workplace performance, and common per 
ceptions, is currently unacceptable. Second, as indicated by the previ 
ous evidence, there is overwhelming evidence that the resources 
devoted to schools—which have been both large and increasing-have 
not been effectively used. Third, the significantly skewed distribution 
of educational success, which leaves poor and minority students 
behind the rest of the population, is incompatible with most people's 
views on the goals of our society.
The previous sections of this paper indicate why "reform" as com 
monly included in school finance considerations is unlikely to address 
any of these causes of concern. The primary focus on the distribution 
of state financial aid or the limits on local fiscal options distracts atten 
tion from the issues of school organization, incentives for perfor 
mance, and the goals of the system. Because of the contentiousness of 
issues surrounding the distribution of funds, school finance debates
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have the potential for absorbing all energy related to school policy. 
Thus, in addition to generally offering few solutions to the problems 
previously identified, there is a significant opportunity cost in stalling 
some of the fundamental restructuring that must proceed if we are to 
deal with the current problems of schools. This problem of distraction, 
of course, is not inevitable, but there are strong forces pushing in that 
direction.
The concentration of courts and legislatures on finance reform while 
skirting away from more fundamental policy considerations does fol 
low a certain logic. Expenditures are readily measurable; there is a 
plausible argument behind their importance; there is no obvious alter 
native focus of policy; and operating on expenditure at least represents 
doing something. In other words, there are serious problems, and it is 
perceived that at least some attempt to remedy them should be under 
taken.
This logic is supported by the lack of convincing evidence that any 
specific approaches or policies will bring about significant improve 
ments in student performance. As reviewed previously, no set of sim 
ple changes involving either resources or programs shows a 
consistently strong relationship with performance.
But that is just the problem. Concentrating solely on dollars or 
resources does not confront the basic structural problems in the opera 
tions of schools. For example, while Jonathan Kozol (1991) points to 
the lack of achievement of impoverished students and calls for 
increased funding, he ignores the fact that the increased funding will 
be administered by the same school boards and administrators that he 
railed against in Death at an Early Age (Kozol 1967). An alternative 
approach, which suffers from many of the same problems, is to argue 
that additional funds would not be utilized in old unproductive ways 
but would be used in highly directed ways that insured achievement. 
This approach is often accompanied by the description of a specific 
program that has been shown to work in the few places where it has 
been tried. The problem, of course, is that we really do not know in 
general terms what will work, and the successful programs that have 
been identified have not been broadly introduced by districts with the 
funds to do so (for example, through general federal compensatory 
education funding or more generous local support). There is simply no 
reason to believe that a centrally directed system of increased funding
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relying on the simple identification of productive programs or spend 
ing patterns would be more productive than what has been currently 
observed.
An alternative formulation of educational policies avoids the pitfalls 
of previous approaches and offers considerably more promise of 
improvement. The alternative is moving to organizations and incentive 
systems that directly reward performance. The current set of policies, 
almost exclusively pursued, involves providing or requiring certain 
inputs—expenditures, class sizes, teacher attributes, and the like. 
These input policies are essentially pursued and continued without 
regard to their effectiveness, either in the aggregate or in specific 
instances. The proposed alternative is to concentrate on student perfor 
mance instead of factors thought (or hoped) to be important in deter 
mining student performance.
Various systems have been used or suggested to promote perfor 
mance-based policies, including merit pay for teachers, merit awards 
for schools that perform well, and a variety of plans emphasizing 
choices among educational institutions. Essentially, the common ingre 
dient of such plans is that resources are directly related to performance: 
if performance is high, resources are high; if performance is low, 
resources are commensurately low. For example, merit pay for teach 
ers operates by increasing salaries of those who perform well and not 
of those who perform poorly. Similarly, choice plans, which operate by 
allowing students and parents to choose among alternative schools, 
work by reinforcing parental judgments about quality schools, with 
suitable flows of resources to the schools that attract students.
The orientation of these policies is based on finding the correct 
incentives. If tangible incentives for improved performance are 
offered, most decision making can be expected to improve. Actual 
operations of hiring, promotion, curriculum, student placement, and 
the like—while not specified or regulated by a central authority—can 
be expected to respond to incentives. This has been demonstrated by 
wide-ranging research, both in education and elsewhere. Determining 
effective incentives, however, will take experimentation, bargaining, 
and evaluation.
There are many different versions of these performance-based 
plans, particularly of the choice plans. Commonly discussed choice 
plans range from magnet or special schools (which are fairly wide-
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spread in some urban districts) to full vouchers, which provide parents 
with funds to pay tuition at either public or private schools of their 
choice. Between these extremes are free choice within public school 
districts, open enrollment in any public school in the state, and tuition 
tax credits to rebate a portion of any tuition payments to the parents.
Performance-based options have been discussed widely and will not 
be reviewed here (see Chubb and Hanushek 1990). Instead I will 
merely highlight two features. Each option has conceptually appealing 
elements. And there is little historical evidence for each option that 
would provide details of either how it should be implemented or the 
magnitude of gains that might be expected. In other words, there is also 
considerable uncertainty, particularly about details of implementation, 
because these approaches are largely untried. The uncertainty should 
not, however, be taken as a reason for avoiding them but should dictate 
a more interactive approach to policy making instead. Moreover, as 
indicated, each performance-based option has considerable appeal, 
especially as an option to the almost universally employed input poli 
cies that have had such a dismal record.
The performance-based view of educational policy is very different 
from the current view of how to make policy. It also is not very amena 
ble to the simple remedies and simple tracking of responses so appeal 
ing within a court context. Nevertheless, for all its messiness and 
uncertainty, it offers some realistic hopes for improvement—some 
thing that is absent from narrow decisions on expenditure and other 
inputs.
The use of performance-based plans is supported by the research 
into educational performance reviewed above. This research indicated 
extremely large and significant variations in the performance of indi 
vidual teachers and schools. It is also very important to reiterate here 
that research has concentrated on the value-added of teachers and not 
on absolute performance levels of students. The research demonstrates 
that there can be low value-added in a "good" suburban school where 
the absolute level of achievement is quite high. Similarly, there can be 
high value-added within "bad" central city schools where students 
come to school quite unprepared but leave with marked increases in 
their achievement (see, for example, Hanushek 1992). While research 
cannot identify the components of successful and unsuccessful teach 
ing, it supports the simple but powerful notion that good performance
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can be identified by school administrators (see Murnane 1975 and 
Armor et al. 1976). Further, if this capacity can be extended to individ 
ual parents—who frequently at least act as if they can tell the differ 
ence between good and bad teachers—the groundwork for 
performance-based policies is established.
The overall point is straightforward: a range of effective policies 
appears to be available. They are, however, almost certainly very dif 
ferent from the traditional policy focus and the orientation of tradi 
tional school finance "reform" efforts. Moreover, instituting some of 
these fundamental reforms might take added funds, particularly in the 
implementation and learning phases. There is a huge difference, as 
should be clear, between expenditures directly linked to improved 
incentives and student performance and expenditures made in the 
hopes that something good will happen.
Finally, the restructuring of incentives in schools appears to be the 
only feasible answer to dealing with the gloomy record schools have in 
improving the performance of educationally and economically disad- 
vantaged youth. Various input-oriented programs have been mounted 
to deal with the disadvantaged, including a large portion of all federal 
spending on schools, but there is little evidence that this has had much 
impact. The alternative to restructuring incentives as proposed here is 
to continue to expand the programs that have thus far been unsuccess- 
fiil.
The evidence from past analyses demonstrates that good teachers 
exist in what are commonly thought to be bad urban districts. Their 
existence, however, is masked by generally low achievement levels; 
that is, even though an individual teacher may elicit more than one 
year of achievement growth within a one-year period, low absolute 
levels of performance could hide it. The policy problem is that we have 
not been able to attract, to identify, and retain sufficiently large num 
bers of such good teachers so as to have the kind of influence that is 
needed. This is just the appeal of performance-based incentive 
schemes. They are designed to reinforce good performance. We 
should, at the same time, not have overly optimistic expectations. As 
has been thoroughly documented, family influences are very powerful 
in determining achievement levels; so while specific teachers might 
have a substantial influence on achievement, they might not immedi 
ately overcome the deficits arising from factors outside the schools.
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Indeed, it may take the continued efforts of many good teachers over 
the course of the student's school career. This reality, however, should 
not deter our efforts to provide the best possible education.
Conclusions
School finance reform, as commonly espoused in courts and legisla 
tures across the country, is likely to work against the very improve 
ments most needed in public schools. By its nature, emphasizing 
primarily the distribution of expenditure per student, financing reform 
is almost certain to exacerbate existing problems of inefficiency in 
school operation.
Discussions of school finance reform typically attempt to separate 
considerations of efficiency from issues of "equity." Such a distinction 
is impossible, however, if the definition of equity involves the learning 
of children, which depends directly on the ability of school districts to 
translate resources into student achievement. If schools are ineffective 
at this task, little can be done to improve equity in student performance 
by simply heaping more resources on poorly performing districts.
Research into the relationship between resources and student perfor 
mance, conducted over the past quarter century, has demonstrated con 
clusively that, within the current organization and operation of 
schools, there is no consistent relationship between resources and stu 
dent performance. Common policy proposals—ones that are used to 
justify pleas for added resources to school districts—simply are not 
supported by evidence about their performance within schools.
Ignoring the evidence on performance is likely to worsen the prob 
lems of performance and inefficiency. The current incentive structure 
in schools does not promote efficient use of resources. Therefore, while 
additional funds might be used effectively by some districts, other dis 
tricts will probably use them ineffectively—which, if past history is a 
guide, leads to no aggregate improvement in performance from 
increased funds.
Large differences in performance exist among teachers and schools. 
Past evidence further indicates that parents and administrators can 
identify the best and worst among these. What is missing is an effec-
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live structure for channeling knowledge about performance into over 
all improvement in the schools. A variety of mechanisms for this have 
been proposed; although there is little operational experience with 
them, the key to each is that resources are more directly linked to per 
formance of the schools. This is an entirely different perspective from 
what has been found in most discussions of school finance reform, 
which gives no weight to student performance in making resource allo 
cations.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970) or Wise (1968).
2. The term "efficient" here is used in the economist's sense of obtaining the maximum possi 
ble performance from any given expenditure of resources. This definition is very different from 
that which appears to have been employed in a number of legal arguments emanating from state 
constitutional requirements to provide an efficient system of public schools.
3. See, for example. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970, p. 29) where they discuss Ribich 
(1968). They state, "Ribich's painstaking analyses suggest, if anything, a variety of sometimes 
conflicting relationships between cost and purely economic benefits from added dollar incre 
ments." They go on to indicate, "There are similar studies suggesting stronger positive conse 
quences from dollar increments, and there are others suggesting only trivial consequences, but the 
basic lesson to be drawn from the experts at this point is the current inadequacy of social science 
to delineate with any clarity the relation between cost and quality. We are unwilling to postpone 
reform while we await the hoped-for refinements in methodology which will settle the issue" (p. 
30).
4. For example, after discussing the difficulty of employing alternative measures of real 
resource differences (such as education levels of teachers), Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970, p. 
26) state: "We have no stomach for such an imbroglio. Ultimately we will need a standard appro 
priate to the rigors of judicial proof, and the only convincingly quantifiable item in the spectrum is 
money available for the general task of education in each district."
5. This section draws extensively on the presentation in Hanushek (1989) which in turn 
updates previous analyses in Hanushek (1981, 1986).
6. Current expenditures per student are deflated by the consumer price index. See Digest of 
Education Statistics, 1989, tables 88 and 114, and updates.
7. On the other hand, evidence from international tests in 1964 suggest that U.S. students have 
historically done relatively poorly (Husen 1967).
8. Digest of Education Statistics, 1988, table 51.
9. Moreover, only 3 percent of teachers in 1986 were in their first year of teaching (Digest of 
Education Statistics, 1988, table 54). The aging and stagnation of the teaching force have, how 
ever, been the subject of separate concerns.
10. The teacher salary data over time that are normally cited are provided by the National 
Education Association, and the sample and reliability of these are unknown (Digest of Education 
Statistics, 1988, table 57). An alternative source, the decennial population censuses, indicates 
smooth increases in salaries of teachers by decade, but these fall relative to annual earnings of all 
college graduates. See Hanushek, Rivkin, and Jamison (1992).
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11. There were also extensive analyses of the report's methodology and of the validity of its 
inferences. See, for example, Bowles and Levin (1968), Cain and Watts (1970), and Hanushek 
and Kain (1972).
12. A qualified study was defined as a production function estimate that: (1) is published in a 
book or refereed journal; (2) relates some objective measure of student output to characteristics of 
the family and the schools attended; and (3) provides information about the statistical significance 
of estimated relationships. Note that a given publication can contain more than one estimated pro 
duction function by considering different measures of output, different grade levels, or different 
samples of students (but different specifications of the same basic sample and outcome measure 
count as only one study). Search procedures for articles involved using the national educational 
data base (ERIC), searching the bibliographies of included and related articles, and scanning the 
tables of content of likely journals. No articles uncovered in this search and meeting the above cri 
teria were excluded, but inevitably some were missed. Articles from this time period that were 
overlooked in the search process but that have subsequently been discovered include Brown 
(1972). Walberg and Rasher (1974). Wendling and Cohen (1981). and Walberg and Fowler 
(1987). And, of course, there have been publications subsequent to construction of this table. The 
inclusion of these articles does not change the weight of the evidence or the substantive conclu 
sions reached.
13. The tabulations, when stratified by grade level, by whether individual or aggregate data 
were used, by output measure, and by value-added or level forms of estimation, yield the same 
qualitative conclusions.
14. Tabulated results are adjusted for variables being measured in the opposite direction; for 
example, the sign for estimated relationships including student-teacher ratios, instead of teacher- 
student ratios, is reversed.
15. Teacher-pupil ratios are treated here as synonymous with class sizes. This is not strictly 
the case and, in fact, could be misleading today. Several changes in schools, most prominently the 
introduction of extensive requirements for dealing with handicapped children in the mid-1970s, 
have led to new instructional personnel without large changes in typical classes. Since much of 
the evidence here refers to the situation before such legislation and restrictions, it is reasonable to 
interpret the evidence as relating to class sizes.
16. In any statistical analysis, which necessarily relies on a sample of all possible students and 
classroom environments, an estimated relationship may not be real but only perceived to be so 
because of the specific sample. Standard regression techniques provide ways of estimating the 
likelihood of being fooled by the sampling into thinking there is a relationship when in fact there 
is not. The shorthand term, "statistical significance," implies that less than 5 percent of the time 
when there is really no relationship would we get an estimate as large as the one obtained. In other 
words, when the estimate is "statistically significant," we are quite confident that some relation 
ship does indeed exist. In all cases, however, the estimates of statistical significance assume that 
the "correct" relationship is being estimated; that is, that the model of achievement is properly 
specified to include the relevant factors determining performance.
17. Note that not all studies report the sign of insignificant coefficients. For example, 45 stud 
ies report insignificant estimated coefficients for teacher-student ratios but do not report any fur 
ther information.
18. Note that only 113 studies report evidence about teacher education. Since data on teacher 
education are so readily available, it seems likely that a number of additional studies investigated 
teacher education effects but discarded the results without reporting them after finding negative or 
insignificant effects.
19. Information on each of these is less frequently available. This is partially explained by 
common reliance on administrative records which do not record them (except perhaps teacher sal-
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aries). The level of the analysis and sampling frame for some studies offer another explanation; 
for example, since expenditures per student are generally measured for districts, the analyses that 
rely on individual student data for a single district would find no variation in this input and thus 
could not include it. More recent studies have generally concentrated on the analysis of individual 
student and classroom data and thus have not considered aggregate expenditure effects.
20. The interpretation of expenditure and salary estimates is sometimes clouded by including 
them in addition to teacher experience, education, and class size. Because multiple regression 
coefficients indicate the effect of a specific variable when all other variables are held constant, 
direct measures of expenditure, for example, in models also including the prime determinants of 
instructional spending would be interpreted as the effect of noninstructional expenditures on 
achievement. Also, because prices can vary across the samples in the separate studies, it is more 
difficult to interpret dollar measures than real input measures. Finally, eight of the thirteen signifi 
cant positive expenditure results in table 1 come from the different estimates of Sebold and Dato 
(1981). In this study, imprecise measurement of family inputs suggests that school expenditures 
may in fact mainly be a proxy for family background.
21. There are several obvious reasons for caution in interpreting this evidence. For any indi 
vidual study, incomplete information, poor quality data, or faulty research could distort the statis 
tical results. Even without such problems, the actions of school administrators could mask any 
relationship. For example, if the most difficult students to teach were consistently put in smaller 
classes, any independent effect of class size could be difficult to disentangle from the mismea- 
surement of a students' characteristics. Finally, the statistical insignificance of estimates can 
reflect no relationship, but it also can reflect a variety of data problems, including high correla 
tions among the different measured inputs. In other words, as in most research, virtually any of 
the studies is open to some sort of challenge.
22. This issue is discussed in Hedges (1990). "The published literature is particularly suscepti 
ble to the claim that it is unrepresentative of all studies that may have been conducted (the so- 
called publication bias problem). There is considerable empirical evidence that the published lit 
erature contains fewer statistically insignificant results than would be expected from the complete 
collection of all studies actually conducted. . .. There is also direct evidence that journal editors 
and reviewers intentionally include statistical significance among their criteria for selecting 
manuscripts for publications.... The tendency of the published literature to overrepresent statisti 
cally significant findings leads to biased overestimates of effect magnitudes from published litera 
ture. ..." (p. 19, listed references omitted).
23. These studies are analyses of covariance or, equivalently, regression analysis using indi 
vidual teacher (or school) dummy variables in addition to measures of prior student achievement, 
family background factors, and other explicitly identified inputs in a regression format. See 
Hanushek (1971,1992); Murnane (1975); Armor et al.(1976); and Murnane and Phillips (1981).
24. Perhaps the closest thing to a consistent conclusion across the studies is that "smarter" 
teachers, ones who perform well on verbal ability or achievement tests, do better in the classroom. 
Nonetheless, while plausible, there remains mixed evidence on how good teacher tests are at indi 
cating teaching ability. Tabulations similar to those in table 1 indicate thirty-one studies that have 
analyzed teacher verbal scores. Of these, eight find positive and significant relationships, and 
another ten find positive but insignificant relationships. These overall findings have been extended 
by a recent study by Ronald Ferguson (1991), which finds teacher ability as measured by scores 
on the Texas teacher test to be related to student performance, although that study is insufficient to 
change the weight of the evidence.
25. The idea of skill differences among teachers is not the only possible interpretation of the 
data. Differences in achievement across classrooms could reflect differences in teachers, in other 
classroom-specific factors, or a combination of both. The teacher skill interpretation is suggested
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by the fact that principals' ratings of teachers are correlated with the covariance estimates of class 
room differences; see Murnane (1975) and Armor et al. (1976). Evidence on the stability of 
teacher effects across grades, test area, and years for individual teachers further supports the inter 
pretation based on teacher skill; see Hanushek (1992). A discussion of skill differences in the pro 
duction function context can be found in Hanushek (1986).
26. School finance court cases have typically contained two elements. First, an equal protec 
tion argument is employed, which asserts that school expenditure differences related to variations 
in the local property tax base are discriminatory. Second, the "education clause" usually found in 
the state constitution is used to back an assertion that large variations in expenditures are imper 
missible. In both instances, the direct evidence provided for the alleged wrong involves variations 
in expenditures (sometimes linked to other things such as property tax wealth).
27. See New York State Office of the Comptroller, Financial Data for School Districts, 1982 
and U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov°- 
ernment Printing Office, 1983), tables A and C.
28. The argument of municipal overburden is that excessive demands for nonschool expendi 
tures faced by urban districts subtract from what otherwise would be available for schools. There 
fore, the state funding formula should recognize these other expenditures in allocating school 
support. See the arguments in Levittown. For an economic analysis, see Brazer and McCarty 
(1987).
29. As described, there is considerable variation in tax bases and poverty rates within a state. 
Thus, for example, Albany had a property tax base per student that was 34 percent above the state 
average, and yet it also had a poverty rate above the state average. Cutting back on funds for this 
"wealthy" district would potentially harm sizable numbers of poor children.
30. For example, in the situation in New York State, each of the six large districts except New 
York City had expenditures per student above the state average. See Financial Data for School 
Districts, 1982.
31. This situation, known to economists as "compensating differentials," can exist whenever 
jobs or job locations include different attributes such as riskiness, opportunities for learning, or, in 
the case of cities, favorable living conditions. For a general description, see Ehrenberg and Smith 
(1991) or Hamermesh and Rees (1988). In the context of teachers, see Toder (1972), Antos and 
Rosen (1975), and Kenny and Denslow (1980). Differences in the attractiveness of areas can also 
lead to differences in housing and land prices, thus affecting other inputs to education. See, for 
example, Roback (1982).
32. These calculations rely on estimates of the relationship between expenditures per student 
and wealth per student in districts in these states. The R2 of simple regression in each state was 
less than .20, indicating that one-fifth would be an estimate of the upper bound on the potential for 
equating spending by eliminating property tax base differences.
33. This study is entitled "Education Resources and Student Achievement: Good News for 
Schools," presumably because it was one of the few studies that ever found statistically significant 
relationships between expenditure and policy.
34. The basic regression models estimated include median years of schooling and percent 
below poverty in the district, percent minority students, district size, and pupil/teacher ratio in 
addition to expenditure. Expenditure is measured in several alternative ways, and some formula 
tions include treatment of geographic location of districts.
35. Approved operating expenditure excludes certain categories included in total current 
expenditure, such as some transportation, employee benefits, etc. The average approved expendi 
ture in 1978 for the sampled schools was $2,064, compared to an average total current expendi 
ture for the state of $2,527.
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36. The results are unchanged in a qualitative sense if performance is measured by average 
scores in the district as opposed to the percentage of students passing the BCT examinations. The 
magnitude of changes in average scores is somewhat less than of the changes in pass rates pre 
dicted for spending changes, a finding that is consistent with the notion that the average perfor 
mance is relatively close to the established passing score on most of the separate BCTs.
37. Family background is measured according to the percentage of students receiving free or 
reduced lunch and to what percentage is nonwhite. In 1990-91, there are 129 separate school dis 
tricts of which 67 serve countywide populations (outside of city districts), while the remaining 62 
serve individual cities. The estimates are weighted by the number of students in average daily 
attendance, in order to deal with the heteroscedasticity introduced by averaging performance 
across populations of different sizes.
38. The estimates presented exclude two districts (Hoover and Mt. Brook) that are significant 
"outliers in terms of expenditure levels. Because they are noticeably distant from most other dis 
tricts they have an undue influence on the estimated expenditure effects. Including these districts 
yields somewhat larger expenditure effects (ranging from 1.0 to 3.7 percent passing per $1,000 as 
opposed to -.1 to 2.7 percent passing per $1,000 in table 2). Three of the nine estimated coeffi 
cients are significant at the 5 percent level when the two outliers are included. These estimates do 
not, however, provide reliable information about the effects of increasing expenditure because 
there is little or no pattern to expenditures for the remaining 127 districts included in the analysis.
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